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Abstract: 
The highly politicized debate about the recent Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) 
Directive of the European Union led many observers to suspect an ideological battle between 
countries seeking to impose transnational regulation on financial service industries such as 
hedge funds and liberal market economies insisting on the benefits of market discipline in 
order to protect their financial centers. The battle that appeared to particularly pit France 
against the United Kingdom can thus be interpreted as an example of a regulatory paradigm 
shift in the aftermath of the crisis. This article cautions against such an ideas-centered 
account of financial regulation and points to the economic interests that drove the French 
and German agendas. However, contrary to the assumptions of traditional political economy 
approaches, national preferences were not simply defined by the aggregate of a country’s 
economic interests. Rather, industry success in shaping government positions on alternative 
investment regulation crucially depended on how a given industry fit into the government’s 
overarching geo-political agenda. By highlighting this feedback loop between government 
strategy and industry lobbying, the paper proposes a strategic analysis of financial 
regulation, as opposed to accounts that consider positions to be pre-determined by ideas or 
socio-economic structures. 
 
 
Résumé : 
La polémique autour de la directive européenne sur les fonds d’investissement alternatif 
(AIFM) est souvent citée comme exemple d’une bataille idéologique. D’un côté, on trouve les 
pays membre qui insistent sur une réglementation accrue des marchés financiers, en 
particulier la France, de l’autre côté, ceux qui souhaitent préserver le marché libre, 
notamment le Royaume Uni. Nous montrons les limites des récits qui s’intéressent 
uniquement aux paradigmes de la réglementation financière après la crise et insistons sur 
les intérêts économiques derrière les différentes positions. En revanche, les positions 
nationales ne doivent pas être comprises comme simple agrégat des positions de l’industrie 
financière d’un pays. Le succès de leur lobbying dépend en très grande partie de la 
compatibilité des demandes particulières avec la stratégie géopolitique du gouvernement. 
L’objectif de l’article est ainsi de tracer les boucles de rétroaction entre les stratégies des 
gouvernements et le lobbying de l’industrie financière d’un pays, afin de proposer une 
analyse stratégique de la négociation intergouvernementale. 
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Introduction1 
 
Few regulatory issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis have garnered as much public 
attention as the regulation of hedge funds. Hedge funds polarize public opinion and divide 
policy-makers: to some they are speculators who compounded the downward spiral, 
whereas to others they are simply market participants who suffered from the crisis more than 
they contributed to it. As a consequence, the recent regulation of hedge funds in the 
European Union (EU) through the Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) directive 
adopted in November 2010 was one of the most politicized and controversial debates in EU 
financial regulation.  
A superficial reading of the battle that most notably pitted France against the United Kingdom 
(UK) might center on overzealous governments driven by ideology and national interest. 
According to British observers, the AIFM directive was an attack by the French government 
and market place on the City of London. With almost 80% of the hedge fund industry based 
in the UK and only a very small portion in France, President Nicolas Sarkozy had little to lose 
and could demonstrate his will to rein in uncontrolled financial activities and fight against tax 
havens.  The UK, on the other hand, sought to preserve the principal attraction of the City of 
London – light-touch regulation – to avoid curtailing investment opportunities and to prevent 
an exodus of alternative investment firms from the UK. According to many British observers, 
there was little need to tighten regulation.  
Should one conclude that the AIFM directive arose from mere opportunism, whereby 
politicians exploited the financial crisis to advance a pro-regulatory agenda? Did ideologically 
driven governments seize on the turmoil to attack this suspicious industry, all the more 
because only the UK had considerable economic interests at stake? Inversely, what explains 
the regulation of hedge funds in 2010 if they are not directly linked to the financial crisis, as 
some argue? 
This article counters accounts that center on ideological battles over financial regulation. By 
unpacking the positions of the French, British and German governments, I will demonstrate 
that each one defended the interests of its respective industries. These economic interests 
went far beyond hedge funds, as the directive covered quite a large spectrum of investment 
funds, including mutual funds, private equity and real estate funds. However, the links 
between industry and government positions are oftentimes surprising and do not neatly 
reflect either capitalist systems or a given comparative advantage. Most importantly, which 
industries were most successful in influencing government depended on how their demands 
fit into the government’s agenda for financial regulation. This agenda, in turn, mainly hinged 
on a Franco-German alliance that formed during regulatory reform and transcended the 
single issue of hedge fund regulation.  
Put more theoretically, neither ideology nor capitalist systems can fully explain the evolution 
of the AIFM negotiations. Rather the politics of international financial regulation arose from a 
mix of business lobbying and international alliances wherein success and failure depended 
on how the two fit together, rather than on given conditions prior to the regulatory initiative. 
This article thus proposes a strategic account of hedge fund regulation and counters those 
that consider positions to be pre-determined by ideas or socio-economic structures. 
                                                
1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the network meeting on “Institutional Change in the 
Regulation of Financial Markets” organized by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne on 
24-25 March 2011 and at the COST Ph.D. School on Financial Regulation in Paris on 9 May 2011. I would like all 
participants for the discussion and their helpful comments, in particular Rahul Prabhakar, Lucia Quaglia and 
Christine Trampusch. I am furthermore grateful to all interview partners who freely gave of their time, to Helene 
Naegele for excellent research assistance, and to the Max Planck Society, who kindly funded the research 
through an Otto-Hahn research group grant. 
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5 
The empirical account draws on qualitative interviews with industry representatives and 
policy makers in Brussels and the member states between December 2009 and April 2011, 
as well as primary documents such as legislative and policy documents and industry briefs.2 
The remainder of the article divides into five parts. Section 2 discusses theoretical accounts 
of financial governance and hedge fund regulation in particular, and lays out the argument. 
Section 3 describes the history and context of hedge fund regulation prior to the EU’s 
regulatory initiative. I then turn to the central elements of my argument to trace the evolution 
in negotiations. Section 4 discusses the lobbying efforts and industry stakes, within member 
states, that most actively influenced the discussion. Section 5 moves to the international level 
to explain the issue linkages and alliances involved. I then conclude by discussing how these 
two levels became linked and why they explain the final outcome of the negotiations, by 
showing how the lessons of this case study apply more generally to the study of business-
government relations. 
 
 
1. Explaining conflict over financial regulation 
 
Financial regulation, like other areas of regulatory policy-making, is marked by interstate 
conflict. With growing market openness, financial service provision highlights the tensions 
between different regulatory approaches, as national markets increasingly interact with, and 
are exposed to one another. Theoretical work in international political economy and 
European politics has tried to determine the fault lines of this conflict and the direction that 
negotiations over new or harmonized regulatory regimes will most likely take.3 Treading the 
dividing line between political economy accounts and social constructivist perspectives, one 
can distinguish between approaches that focus on the distribution of economic interests and 
those that insist on the importance of ideas and how these shape government preferences 
over international regulation. I will discuss both of these in turn before proposing a more 
dynamic argument that highlights how the defense of domestic economic interests depends 
on the geopolitical agenda governments pursue. This strategic account is related to recent 
historical institutionalist perspectives on international market regulation (Farell/Newman 
2011), but specifically highlights governments’ room for maneuver, rather than the 
importance of historical constraints.  
 
Political-economy perspectives 
Materialist accounts of financial regulation tend to consider the distribution of economic 
interests, the institutions aggregating such societal demands and the relative market size of a 
given country in order to understand what position the government will defend and to what 
extent it can impose its views in international negotiations (Frieden 1991; Frieden 1999). At 
the most basic level, countries that already have a flourishing hedge fund industry would be 
expected to oppose tighter regulation in order to keep investment firms from choosing more 
attractive (i.e. unregulated) locations. Inversely, countries without a sizeable industry 
coalition in favor of light regulation have electoral incentives to push for tighter regulation in 
order to comply with consumer demands or to respond to the general public’s concern about 
the potentially negative effects of unregulated financial markets. 
                                                
2 Interviews included officials from the European Commission, members of the European Parliament, 
representatives from the member states’ governments and regulatory authorities, industry associations and 
lobbyists representing the affected sectors, as well as a public official from the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission.    
3 I will leave aside the discussion of the most relevant level of political authority – international, national or 
transnational (see Helleiner/Pagliari 2011). All levels are linked in the case of hedge fund regulation, but the most 
important issue that needs explaining is the classic question of the nature and evolution of interstate bargaining.  
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A related approach focuses less on the pressure exerted by individual industries, or the 
absence thereof, but instead highlights the general political economic order that 
characterizes advanced industrial nations. This “varieties of capitalism” literature draws 
attention to the institutions supporting the development of national production systems and 
argues that governments will defend those policy regimes that protect the areas in which the 
country has gained a comparative institutional advantage (Crouch/Streeck 1997; 
Hall/Soskice 2001). The size of the countries’ markets and their industry structure therefore 
provide clues about developments in international regulatory negotiations (Drezner 2007). 
Concerning financial regulation, analysis most often focuses on the difference between bank-
based systems, where finance for the economy crucially depends on commercial bank 
lending, and market-based systems, where capital markets are key (Zysman 1983; 
Rajan/Zingales 2001).  
According to both strands, we should expect different regulatory preferences from countries 
with a liberal market tradition, that will seek to protect their light regulatory approach, and 
countries with coordinated market economies or bank-based finance, that will be more 
concerned about commercial banks and the role of finance in the transformation of their 
industrial structure. From such a systemic perspective, Germany should be very supportive 
of hedge fund regulation, both in order to protect their commercial banks and savings banks 
from the competition of new financial intermediaries, and in order to shelter their small and 
medium-sized companies from short-termist sources of finances. Put differently, the political 
economy literature leads us to predict that liberal market economies will be pitted against 
countries with a more coordinated tradition and more regulated financial markets. In the 
context of European politics, Quaglia (2010) refers to these groups of countries as the 
market-making (i.e. liberal) and the market-shaping (i.e. pro-regulatory) coalitions. Moreover, 
this fault line should remain somewhat stable over time, as past decisions create institutional 
advantages for each model and will therefore be supported and defended by both private 
and public actors. 
 
New regulatory paradigms 
Rather than highlighting stability, others have drawn attention to the rapid change in 
international financial regulation and attribute this to the role of new pro-regulatory paradigms 
that gain momentum in the aftermath of crises. In studies of the role of national regulators 
and their interaction in transnational networks, several authors have pointed out that the 
increasingly technical nature of financial regulation fosters a cognitive convergence and 
shared understandings about the necessities of regulatory intervention (e.g. Slaughter 2004; 
Porter 2005). Inversely, the policy preferences of liberal market economies are also the result 
of socialization and interaction of liberal-minded economists, particularly in international 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (Chwieroth 2010). According to such 
constructivist perspectives, understanding change in financial regulation therefore requires 
studying the drivers of regulatory reform and how these elites were trained or exposed to 
networks of like-minded professionals (Abdelal 2007).  
In the European context, the analysis of regulatory paradigms requires paying particular 
attention to the European Commission and other supranational institutions such as the 
European Parliament. Driven by an institutional self-interest to expand its mandate to sectors 
that were previously beyond its remit, the European Commission has turned out to be a key 
player in financial market integration (Posner 2009). In particular, the Commission has in the 
past been able to generate conceptual innovation that was conducive to rallying new 
coalitions around its proposals (Jabko 2006). Its role as a policy entrepreneur therefore 
crucially hinges on the way it uses the new paradigms to channel the interests of member 
states towards further market integration.  
In her analysis of the political economy of alternative investment regulation, Quaglia 
(forthcoming) points to the importance of ideas in explaining the shift from opposition 
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between liberal and regulated market economies towards an agreement on the AIFM 
directive in 2010. The effect of the crisis was to implicitly validate the market-shaping 
regulatory paradigm and to silence supporters of light-touch regulation.  
 
A strategic account of government stances on financial regulation 
Accounts focusing on the stability of political economic orders and analyses focusing on 
paradigmatic change offer important insights into the evolution of financial regulation. 
However, the first is ill equipped to explain changes in government preferences and pays 
insufficient attention to the conditions under which existing domestic interests can 
successfully influence or fail to influence their governments. The second approach, in turn, 
tends to ignore the conditions under which new ideas become “interesting” to governments 
and therefore viable in international negotiations.  
In line with a historical institutionalist analysis of international market regulation, I argue that 
the distribution of economic interests at the domestic level is important but does not 
predetermine government stances. Instead, the timing and sequence of negotiations create 
feedback loops which can favor some domestic interests over others. As a consequence, 
“variation in states’ preferences over existing institutional bargains will depend on which 
interest groups have succeeded in becoming embedded in the relevant regulatory decision-
making structure,” (Farell/Newman 2011: 620). My argument thus relates to Fioretos’ (2010) 
account of international hedge fund regulation. Beginning with a discussion of the fault lines 
among capitalist systems, Fioretos shows how the US changed its position and ended up 
introducing direct regulation, because the sequence of events created favorable conditions 
for policy actors with a pro-regulation agenda.  
By placing even greater emphasis on the degree of government agency, I will describe how 
the evolution in EU negotiations depended on the dynamic interplay between domestic 
interests and the geo-political strategies of the major governments. Contrary to accounts 
claiming that the French and German positions were determined by a simple pro-regulation 
paradigm, I will show that domestic interests pushed for and benefited from the stances 
defended by their governments. However, these economic interests did not determine 
government positions unilaterally. Rather, these industries were successful in lobbying their 
national governments because their demands neatly fit with the strategic alliance the French 
and German governments had decided to form to achieve a revision of the international 
financial architecture. As Woll (2008) has argued, lobbying influences the positions 
governments will take in international negotiations, but government ambitions for these 
negotiations also shape both the way in which interest groups voice their demands, and 
whether they will be successful. In the case of EU hedge fund regulation, we therefore need 
to simultaneously consider the domestic roots of the member state stances and their 
geopolitical alliances.  
 
 
2. From exemption to transnational regulation 
 
Hedge funds are investment vehicles that are notoriously difficult to define, but they generally 
refer to highly leveraged funds that are only accessible to wealthy or institutional investors 
who pay a performance fee to the fund’s manager. Using a variety of investment methods, 
they tend to hold both long and short positions, where investment in supposedly overvalued 
securities is counterbalanced by investment in undervalued securities. Contrary to what the 
term suggests, hedge fund strategies should be considered as “leveraged speculation”, 
which is quite the opposite of the traditional way the term “hedging” is used in finance 
(Edwards 1999: 189). 
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Hedge funds especially developed in countries where securities markets already played a 
central role, such as, most importantly, the US and Britain.4 In both of these countries, the 
regulation of hedge funds happened through indirect regulation. Rather than imposing 
registration or disclosure requirements on the hedge funds themselves, regulation applied to 
the counterparties. These prime brokers, in most cases investment banks, lend the money 
that allows for the highly leveraged strategies of hedge funds. Regulators therefore argued 
that the disclosure requirement and leverage ratios imposed on counterparties were 
sufficient to control for systemic risks. In the US, hedge fund managers were explicitly 
exempt from oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) until recently, 
while British managers had to be accredited by the Financial Service Authority. In continental 
Europe, hedge funds were most often directly regulated through registration, disclosure and 
reporting requirements. In Germany, hedge funds, or more specifically the investment 
techniques they employed, were even prohibited until 2004. In comparison to the US and the 
UK, the French and German hedge fund sector remains negligible to date (see IOSCO 2009; 
see Fioretos 2010). 
The recent move to tighten the regulation of hedge funds at the international, regional and 
national levels is clearly tied to collective efforts in the aftermath of the financial crisis. After 
two decades of simple guidelines and codes of conduct, members of the G20 declared at the 
London summit in April 2009 that they intended to strengthen financial regulation and to 
extend it to sectors that were previously not covered, including “for the first time, 
systematically important hedge funds” (G20 2009: 4). As we will see, EU regulation was 
closely linked to this declaration, as was the regulation that followed in the US, most notably 
through the Dodd-Frank Act .5 It is therefore helpful to recall the history of comparative and 
international regulatory efforts, in order to put the EU AIFM Directive into perspective. 
 
Resisting direct regulation 
The public first became aware of the power of hedge funds in 1992, when a hedge fund run 
by George Soros speculated against the pound sterling and eventually forced Great Britain to 
devalue the pound and leave the European Exchange Rate Mechanism – an episode which 
earned George Soros the title of “the man who broke the Bank of England”. During the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-8, hedge funds arguably contributed to spreading the contagion. In 
1998, the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund run by two 
Nobel Prize-winning economists, threatened to bring down Wall Street; a wide-ranging 
financial collapse was only averted after the US Federal Reserve Bank coordinated a $3.6 
billion bailout.  
At that time, regulators began to scrutinize the industry, which had displayed a spectacular 
growth from 140 funds in 1968 to approximately 3,000 funds in 1998, managing between 
$200 - $ 300 billion in capital, and approximately $ 800 billion to $ 1 trillion in total assets.6 At 
the international level, a new body was created by the G7 nations in 1999 to oversee macro-
prudential risks: the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). The FSF contained a working group on 
highly leveraged institutions that immediately began investigating the risks associated with 
hedge funds (Financial Stability Forum 2000). In the US, the President charged a working 
group composed of the heads of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank, the SEC and the 
                                                
4 The fund itself is a legal entity separate from its manager and can be domiciled in another country. Most often 
hedge funds are registered in offshore financial centers, which attract funds through tax exemptions or low 
regulatory requirements.  
5 See in particular Titel IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. H.R. 4173. Vol. 
Pub.L. 111-203, 21 July 2010. 
6 Compare this to the asset sizes of US commercial banks ($ 4,1 trillion), mutual funds ($5 trillion), private pension 
funds ($4,3 trillion), state and local retirement funds ($2,3 trillion) and insurance companies ($3,7 trillion). All 
figures are from the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, 1999: “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the 
Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,” Report, page 1-2, available at www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf. 
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to investigate the failure of LTCM and 
lessons learned (President's Working Group on Financial Markets 1999). Both investigations 
led to a series of recommendations, but affirmed that the locus of responsibility lay with 
national regulatory authorities, particularly with regard to improving counterparty risk 
management, and especially in matters concerning leveraging. In other words, the reports 
rejected the call by some more critical countries to impose transnational regulation and 
reaffirmed an indirect model of hedge fund regulation that focused on the prime brokers 
providing the hedge funds with funding (see Fioretos 2010: 708-709). While it kept 
responsibility with national regulators, the President’s Working Group nonetheless advocated 
that the SEC work with its counterparts within the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) to develop standards for hedge fund behavior.  
 
Codes of conduct 
At the national level, an attempt by the SEC to increase its oversight administratively through 
a change in the interpretation of the hedge fund exemption was rejected in court in 2006. In 
the UK, no significant regulatory was taken action either. Both countries remained committed 
to indirect regulation and followed up on their vague commitments to international 
coordination through the working groups of the FSF and IOSCO.  
France and Germany, by contrast, both favored a direct regulation approach. In both 
countries, the 1990s and early 2000s were a period of significant financial market reform 
towards deregulation and the liberalization of financial services (Lütz 2000; Deeg 2005; 
O'Sullivan 2007). The decision to move from a traditional bank-based model to more diverse 
financial markets open to different investment vehicles came with distinct legal restrictions on 
these funds. Moreover, there was considerable political debate in both countries about the 
risks associated with open capital markets. In France, discussions most notably focused on 
the issue of a Tobin tax, which was to be levied on financial transactions.  In Germany, the 
role of a British hedge fund in a battle to take over Deutsch Börse and the London Stock 
Exchange prompted the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Franz Müntefering, to 
refer to hedge funds and private equity as “locusts”. The intense debate that followed with 
regard to the long-term responsibilities of investors and the negative consequences of short-
term finances deeply resonated with the German public (Gumbel 2005). With French 
backing, the newly elected Chancelor, Angela Merkel, vowed to push for a tighter regulatory 
regime for hedge funds and made this a central issue of the G8 summit Germany chaired in 
2007 in Heiligendamm. 
These public debates, coupled with continued scrutiny from the consultative working groups 
at the FSF and IOSCO put pressure on hedge funds. Simultaneously, the European Central 
Bank became involved in the issue of systemic risks posed by hedge funds and the 
European Union began working on two directives that directly touched on the operation of 
hedge funds: a new directive on investor protection, the Markets for Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID), and a revision of a directive on collective investments schemes such as 
mutual funds – the directive for Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities (UCITS) – the original version of which had been adopted in 1985.  
Still, both the UK within Europe and the US at the international level resisted the calls for 
direct regulation. Both the FSF and IOSCO working groups were tasked with updating of 
their earlier recommendations in 2007, and the US government reconvened the President’s 
Working Group. The President’s Working Group underlined that “the current regulatory 
structure is working well” and that market discipline was more efficient that public authority in 
regulating the hedge fund market (President's Working Group on Financial Markets 2007: 1). 
In the EU, members of the European Parliament pressed for tighter regulation of hedge 
funds and private equity, most notably through the Rasmussen report and the Lehne report 
in 2008. However, Charlie Mc Creevy, the Irish Internal Market Commissioner, was 
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concerned about the consequences of regulation for the investment industries and 
repeatedly declared that hedge funds would not be regulated by the EU  (see Lutton 2008). 
With the resistance of the US and the UK, the momentum was insufficient for more than a 
series of principles, guidelines, and recommendations, issued by both IOSCO and the FSF 
(cf. IOSCO 2009: p.39). The indirect supervisory approach thus remained in place. However, 
both public authorities and industry in the US and the UK moved to set up a credible self-
governance regime, in order to avoid further regulation. The US Managed Funds Association 
(MFA) developed an industry code of conduct and the President’s Working Group created 
two working groups charged with developing best practices. In Britain, industry created a 
Hedge Fund Working Group (HFWG) in order to develop an industry-based code and the 
London-based Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) also issued a series 
of recommendations (IOSCO 2009: 40; Fioretos 2010). Until the end of 2008, not much 
seemed to threaten this self-governance regime set up to support indirect regulation. 
 
Direct regulation 
And yet, the financial crisis that unfolded in the fall of 2008 led to a new sense of urgency 
and created opportunities for more encompassing reforms. Members of the G20 publically 
acknowledged the limits of the self-governance regime in international finance, and at the 
London Summit in April 2009, they declared their goal of extending regulation to previously 
exempted sectors, in particular hedge funds. In order to do so, they insisted that hedge funds 
or their managers had to be registered with national authorities, and they decided to grant 
the responsibility of monitoring systemic risks associated with hedge funds to the successor 
of the FSF, the Financial Stabilities Board (G20 2009). The G20 agenda mirrored the 
changed US position on financial regulation. In 2009, a bill passed by the House Financial 
Services Committee in November made registration of hedge fund managers mandatory and 
gave states the authority to oversee smaller hedge funds, leaving the SEC in charge of larger 
investment funds (Scannell 2009).7 Shortly after, this Private Fund Investment Advisers 
Registration Act of 2009 became Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. By imposing registration and reporting requirements, the new 
legislation effectively closed the loophole which hedge funds had previously benefited from 
and which the SEC had unsuccessfully tried to change through an administrative rule-making 
procedure in 2006.  
In Europe, and almost in parallel with the London Summit of the G20, the European 
Commission published a proposal to regulate hedge funds and private equity firms through 
registration and disclosure requirements on all funds previously left outside of the UCITS 
directive of 1985. Despite the preceding consultation the Commission had launched and 
despite the staunch opposition of a substantial part of the industry to these regulatory 
ambitions, the proposal followed up on the Rasmussen and Lehne reports of 2008 and 
insisted on the need for a harmonized direct regulatory regime to be applyied across Europe 
(European Commission 2009a; European Commission 2009b). Specifically, the Commission 
proposed that all alternative investment fund managers operating in the European market be 
subject to authorization and oversight according to commonly defined principals. In 
exchange, managers authorized to operate in one of the member states wiould obtain a 
European passport enabling them to operate anywhere in the European market without 
having to apply for additional authorization in the respective countries. Significantly, this 
passport would also be available for managers of funds domiciled in countries outside the 
EU.  
The proposal, which was produced in record time according to most observers, was met with 
outcry from all sides. The investment industry and representatives from liberal market 
economies such as the UK and Ireland complained about the costly regulatory requirements 
                                                
7 The threshold is defined as hedge funds that manage less than $100 million. 
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and sometimes even entirely rejected the proposal. Observers from pro-regulation countries 
were concerned about the scope of the directive and its implications for bringing in funds 
offshore financial centers into the European market. In the intensive negotiations that 
followed in the European Council and Parliament, substantial revisions were introduced and 
the discussion came close to entirely breaking down in several instances.  
We will analyze the different positions and study the evolution of negotiations in the following 
sections. However, it should already be clear that the EU directive was more than just a 
consequence of the financial crisis. The directive proposal even clearly states that “AIFM 
were not the causes of the crisis” (European Commission 2009b: 3). Indeed, hedge funds 
themselves suffered considerably: almost 2,000 hedge funds went bankrupt and about $ 530 
billion of their assets were destroyed from 2008-2010 (Aglietta 2010). Should one therefore 
conclude that the financial crisis only provided a welcome opportunity to advance the pro-
regulatory ideology of France, Germany and the European Commission?  
 
 
3. Economic interests in European alternative investment 
 
Understanding the stakes and the evolution in regulatory efforts requires studying the 
interests and coalitions within the EU that led to the current regulatory framework. We will 
therefore examine in which countries the affected industries were located and analyze their 
lobbying strategies.  
 
Stakeholders within and beyond the hedge fund industry 
As highlighted by different regulatory approaches highlighted, the hedge fund industry 
comprises several stakeholders: investors; the fund itself; the managers/advisors of the fund 
and the prime broker/dealers, who provide lending to support leverage and facilitate short 
selling, but also provide clearing and settlement of trades, and custodial services. In some 
cases, prime brokers can outsource services to separate custodians. Similarly, hedge fund 
managers can outsource administrative functions such as accounting or risk analysis to fund 
administrators. All in all, this implies that a considerable number of financial service activities 
are linked to the hedge fund industry (see Hardie/MacKenzie 2007). 
The United States is the largest center for hedge fund management, accounting for 68% of 
the total industry in late 2009, followed by Europe with 23% and Asia with 6%. Within 
Europe, 76% were managed out of London. Other important locations include Sweden (5%), 
Switzerland (4%), France (2%) and the Netherlands (2%). The funds themselves are 
predominately domiciled in offshore financial centers: the Cayman Islands are the most 
popular with 39%, followed by Delaware (US) with 27%, the British Virgin Islands with 7% 
and Bermuda with 5% of funds. Another 5% of global hedge funds are registered in the EU, 
primarily in Ireland and Luxembourg.  
The attraction of the UK for hedge fund management is linked to its concentration of related 
services. With approximately half of the European investment banking activity conducted 
through London, it is a central location for prime brokerage, but also administration, custody 
and auditing. However, among the largest hedge fund prime brokers, one can also find 
Deutsche Bank (6% share of the brokerage industry), and among hedge fund administrators 
the French CACEIS Investor Services (6%) and the Fortis Prime Fund Solution (6%), which 
is currently owned by the French bank BNP Paribas (all figures from International Financial 
Services London 2010). Ireland is another important location for hedge fund administration. 
Finally, many hedge funds in Europe have recently launched UCITS III compliant fund 
vehicles, which they are allowed to distribute throughout Europe to retail clients. In other 
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words, hedge funds not only offer institutional investors products but have adapted to the 
regulated retail investor market in order to provide funds which qualify for the European 
UCITS passport. UCITS services under hedge fund management grew by an impressive 
50% in 2009, particularly in the UK, but also in France and Luxembourg (International 
Financial Services London 2010). This development is significant, because it implies that 
hedge funds are beginning to enter into competition with the traditional mutual fund industry, 
which is regulated since 1985 under the UCITS directive that prohibits both leveraging and 
short-selling. Second only to the US at the global level, France is a prime location of UCITS 
funds both in terms of management and domicile. 23% of European UCITS funds are 
managed in France, followed by Germany (20,1%) and the UK (15,8%). In terms of domicile, 
France comes in second with 20,3% of funds, after Luxembourg (26,2%) (Association 
française de la gestion financière 2010). 
However, the AIFM directive is not just an issue for the hedge fund industry and its 
competitors. Indeed, one of the most central and most controversial decisions of the initial 
proposal was to address hedge funds through a directive covering all investment funds that 
were previously left outside the realm of EU legislation. The definition of the scope of the 
AIFM directive is therefore a negative definition, seeking to cover “the management and 
administration of any non-UCITS in the European Union” (European Commission 2009b: 6). 
While pension funds and non-pooled investment such as sovereign wealth funds were 
excluded, private equity and venture capital funds, real estate funds, commodity funds, 
infrastructure funds and other types of institutional funds wiould have to comply with the 
AIFM provisions. The private equity industry was especially concerned about the directive. 
Private equity firms, which provide funding for companies that are not publically traded on 
stock exchanges, are mainly managed in the UK (12,4%), but also in France (4,7%), 
Germany (3,3%) and Sweden (1,7%) (TheCityUK Research Center 2010). In Germany, real 
estate funds furthermore play an important role.  
It is thus incorrect to state that only the UK had considerable economic interests at stake 
because it is home to almost 80% of the hedge fund industry. To be sure, the City of London 
had a stake in almost all aspects of the hedge fund industry, as well as all other affected 
investment funds. But France and Sweden also have important hedge fund activities, and all 
the more so if related services such as prime brokerage are included. As preferred locations 
for the registration of funds within Europe, Ireland and Luxembourg furthermore had an 
interest in keeping the hedge fund industry flourishing. If one includes private equity and 
other investment vehicles, the spread of economic stakeholders becomes even broader.  
The industries and firms that we would expect to lobby in support of light-touch regulation 
can thus been found in the UK, France and Germany. Further support would be likely from 
Sweden, Luxembourg and Ireland, if one considers industry stakes only. 
However, what is mostly overlooked is that a specific branch of the investment industry was 
quite concerned about the growth in the unregulated investment sector: collective investment 
funds falling under UCITS.  These funds had begun to enter into the hedge funds market, 
where they encountered competition from hedge funds offering UCITS-compliant products. 
This implied that UCITS funds had a strong interest in assuring that this competition 
happened within the UCITS regulatory framework, wherein all market players would bear the 
same costs. UCITS funds are predominately located in France. In the following, I will argue 
that it is the political influence of the UCITS industry that led to the French government’s 
refusal to accept a European passport for third country funds. 
 
Lobbying strategies  
Many members of the investment industry only realized how imminent EU regulation was 
when they read the first proposal of the European Commission in April 2009. Investment 
funds had become used to being unregulated and only paid partial attention to the 
consultation procedure the Commission had launched between December 2008 and January 
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2009. For the private equity industry in particular, the draft was a cold shower they did not 
expect, because they had done their utmost to insist on being exempted from investment 
regulation (interview with a business representative, Brussels, 4 March 2011). For a long-
time, private equity groups felt that they were “legitimately not regulated”, because they 
provided financing to small and medium-size companies; in the case of venture capital “they 
were the nice guys” helping firms focusing on technological innovation, even in risky areas 
(interviews with a business representative, Paris, 10 February 2011; European Commission, 
10 March 2011).   
In the period following the publication of the proposal, the CEOs of investment funds relied 
on their well-established ties with national politicians and sometimes even insisted on their 
most basic desire: to be exempt from the pending regulation. This initial lobbying period was 
somewhat awkward and unsuccessful at the European level. According to one 
representative, 
[Within the EU] if you fail to convince at the technical and technocratic level, it 
does not help you to be friends with the finance minister of your country or to be 
able to stand on your head. […] Knowledge of the procedure is very important. 
[The investment managers], taken individually, may be falcons, but taken 
together, they behaved like a bunch of frightened sparrows trying to stop a 
steam roller (interview, Brussels, 4 March 2011). 
It took a learning curve for investment firms to get organized and begin to contribute 
constructively to the negotiations in order to limit the negative impact on their sector of 
activity. Eventually, most business associations ended up endorsing the general ambition of 
the proposal, but suggested substantial modifications to the heart of the text. The private 
equity industry’s lobbying strategy is quite illustrative of this development: its European 
association EVCA withdrew an initial policy statement in which it had spoken out entirely 
against the proposal, and began to support the idea of European harmonization in order to 
be able to shape the details of the directive (interview, European Commission, Brussels, 10 
March 2011).  
Simultaneously, the national associations lobbied their ministries, regulators and national 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to gain support for the common position. 
British industry representatives from all concerned domains furthermore coordinated their 
lobbying in both London and Brussels and deployed a tremendous effort to shift the details of 
the draft as well as the general attitude in the European Parliament but also the Commission 
towards an approach favoring light-touch regulation.  
Still, the British industry was initially not very adept at taking collective action, because they 
had never been the objects of substantial regulatory efforts. Firms could chose to be 
represented by AIMA, by the Association of Investment Companies (AIC) or the Investment 
Management Association (IMA), but membership is not obligatory, contrary to France, for 
example. A 2009 parliamentary report highlighted that the Hedge Fund Standards Board, 
which collectively defines industry standards through AIMA’s voluntary code of conduct, had 
only 34 members out of 400 to 450 firms (House of Commons 2009: 128). To ward off what 
was perceived to be a European attack on the British regulatory model, Her Majesty’s 
Treasury, the FSA and industry mobilized in several working groups. As one public official 
explained,   
Treasury held town hall meetings with hedge fund managers. You had guys 
worth hundreds of millions sitting on the floor because there was not enough 
space. They thought it would all be fine, that there was no way [the regulation] 
could happen. They would just shout or yell when we told them otherwise (cited 
in Prabhakar 2011: 23). 
In contrast to these big investment funds, which only grasped the importance and functioning 
of the European policy-making process over the course of the negotiations in 2009 and 2010, 
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the UCITS industry had already been playing the game since 1985. Having been active 
during several revisions of the UCITS directive, they monitored developments in Brussels 
much more closely and already had well-established ties at the national level with public 
officials working on EU regulation, as well as in Brussels. This difference in EU public affairs 
experience would turn out to matter immensely, since the UCITS industry was able to make 
a very forceful case against some of the provisions of the AIFM directive early on (interview 
with a business representative, Frankfurt A.M., 21 February 2011). According to one 
observer, the relationship between these funds and the French finance ministry is the only 
plausible reason that can explain the rigid position France defended throughout the 
negotiations. He argued, 
[French finance minister] Lagarde and [other French representatives] took issue 
with third country passports, even though it was not the position of the banking 
and private equity industry, or of French investors. But a small portion of the 
UCITS industry ended up being in competition with hedge funds and was afraid 
that these would be exempted from the regulatory costs weighing on the UCITS 
industry. They therefore said ‘If they get a passport, we are dead’ and the 
government ran with it all the way (interview with a business representative, 
Brussels, 4 March 2011).  
Indeed, a French public official declared himself to be puzzled by his government’s position, 
since it “[did] not reflect the interests of the French investment industry, which looks much 
more similar to the British industry than one would be led to believe,” (interview, Paris, 25 
November 2009).  
While the French government argued that its position was congruent with its battle against 
tax havens, which often host alternative investment funds, several observers doubt the 
validity of this argument. According to proponents of the proposal, including French MEPs 
like Jean-Paul Gauzès, it is more efficient to impose constraints on tax havens with a 
passport system than without one (interview, Paris, 19 May 2011). 
Why was a small portion of the French industry so efficient in its lobbying that it outweighed 
all other business interests on these issues and almost brought the AIFM negotiations to a 
stand-still? In the following section, I will argue that we need to consider the member states’ 
strategic alliances on financial regulation more generally, to understand which demands 
translated into the ones the member states defended at the EU level. 
 
 
4. Geopolitical stakes and the Franco-German alliance 
 
Most notably, a Franco-German alliance on regulatory reform in international finance turned 
out to be crucial to the evolution in AIFM negotiations. The joint interest in hedge fund 
regulation began as early as 2007, at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, but at the time 
proponents of a more regulatory approach had little traction. As the financial crisis unraveled, 
both French and German policy-makers realized that they should seize the opportunity to 
advance their respective objectives.  
Germany had remained suspicious of hedge funds since it allowed their operation in 2004 
and wished to tightly regulate them. The experience of the Deutsche Börse take-over and a 
general public mistrust towards alternative investment funds such as private equity, turned 
hedge funds into fertile ground for political activism in Germany (cf Milne 2008). French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, in turn, sought to capitalize on the financial crisis to become the 
founding father of a new financial architecture he intended to push under the French 
presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008, and later under the French presidency of 
the G20 from 2010 to 2011, just months before his upcoming election. Facing countries with 
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a more light-touch tradition on financial regulation, the two governments made a pact to 
support each other in order to defend a pro-regulatory agenda against the Anglo-Saxon 
laissez-faire tradition. This general agreement fundamentally shaped alternative investment 
negotiations. According to a French government representative:  
Ten years ago, we were like the Germans, but we have liberalized a lot recently 
[…]. But on [alternative investment] we do not argue against the German position 
for political reasons, which come from the highest level. President Sarkozy has 
asked us to support Germany all the way,” (interview, Paris, 25 November 2009).  
The first person to succumb to the pressure of the Franco-German alliance was Internal 
Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy. Initially, he had publicly declared that hedge funds 
would not be regulated under his leadership, and allegedly signaled to his staff that anybody 
working on such a proposal would be fired (interview cited in Prabhakar 2011: 110). Yet as 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso faced re-election in 2009, the French and 
German governments indicated that progress on a hedge fund directive was important to 
obtaining their support. With similar signals from the European Parliament, Barroso insisted 
that a proposal be ready as soon as April 2009. As a result of these political imperatives, a 
proposal was produced in record time and without much exchange with national officials after 
the official consultation in January 2009. The inspiration for much of the original text came 
from existing European directives, in particular UCITS and MiFID, in the interest of saving 
time.  This explains why even supporters of the regulation were disgruntled when they read 
the first draft (interview, Paris, 10 December 2009). Arguing that British mistrust was partly 
unjustified, a French official underscored that,”[the British were] convinced that France [was] 
behind this directive, but I can assure you that it came from DG Market, maybe with some 
help from the Germans,” (interview, Paris, 25 November 2009).  
Most importantly, German government representatives were concerned about the effects of 
alternative investment on the company structure and corporate governance regime of 
German firms. They therefore wanted the most comprehensive regulation possible to ensure 
that any type of investment would not threaten co-decision procedures and worker rights. 
France might have not been behind hedge fund regulation in general, but it did have strong 
opinions when it came to the details. A European solution was advantageous, because the 
UCITS blueprint that was copied into the AIFM proposal reflected many of the particularities 
of the French market. However, the French were very concerned about the third country 
passport, the negative effects of which had been highlighted by their UCITS industry. 
Throughout the eighteen months of negotiations and the 18 trialogues between the 
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, this issue turned into the most 
important bone of contention. French showed no intention of opening the European market to 
offshore funds – a position that effectively made the proposal inacceptable to the British 
industry.  
After repeated stalemates in July, September and October 2010, it became clear that France 
was isolated in its opposition to the third country passport in the Council. And yet, in the run-
up to an Ecofin Council, the treasury secretary who was supposed to represent Germany got 
a call from the finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, who insisted “I promised Christine 
Lagarde that you will not isolate her,” (interview, Brussels, 4 March 2011).  In spite of their 
doubts about the substance of the French position, the Germans thus afforded France some 
extra time to propose a last compromise, which suggested that the new European Securities 
Market Authority (ESMA) should be charged with the licensing of third-country fund access to 
the EU market (EurActiv 2010a). The British refused to grant such powers to a European 
authority and even US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner intervened by writing to French 
Finance Minister Christine Lagarde to warn about the consequences of French 
protectionism.  
With strong opposition from the UK and German support waning, the French finally decided 
to accept a compromise that allowed third-country access and left it up to national regulators 
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to grant third-country funds access. In exchange, the UK accepted to delay access for third-
country funds until 2015. Moreover, ESMA was charged with drawing up the requirements 
these funds would have to fulfill, and it is expected to settle disputes between national 
regulators if they disagree on the elegibility of a given fund (EurActiv 2010c).  
This final agreement was reached on 26 October 2010, leading to adoption by the European 
Parliament on 11 November, just in time to present the new EU regulatory framework at the 
G20 meeting in Seoul on 12 November, before it was approved by the Council of Ministers 
on 17 November. While member states concentrated on national fault lines, the European 
Parliament moved to pass substantial changes to the initial proposal, tabling a total of 1690 
amendments! This unusually high number was necessary, according to MEP and directive 
rapporteur Jean-Paul Gauzès, in order to build support from both camps: those who insisted 
on the need for more control and those who pointed to the attendant costs for affected 
industries (interview, Paris, 19 May 2011). To bring the hastily written draft in line with the 
realities of different alternative investment funds, he held 198 meetings with industry 
representatives (Serrouya 2010). The European Commission official following the directive 
admits he stopped counting after the number of meetings reached 150 (interview, Brussels, 
March 2011).  
The directive came into force in January 2011. From this date, each Member States has two 
years to transpose the directive into national law, with the assistance of the ESMA, which will 
provide advice on the most appropriate implementation measures for the 210 pages of the 
directive. This means that the directive will only become effective in practice in January 2013. 
The passport for third country funds and managers will become available after an additional 
two-year transition period, in January 2015.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The AIFM directive was one of the EU’s most disputed post-crisis regulations.  Most 
importantly, it pitched France against the United Kingdom. As with most political 
compromises, none of the negotiators obtained what they initially sought. While the United 
Kingdom had to accept that alternative investment would be regulated at the supranational 
level, France did not succeed in excluding offshore funds from the European market. 
Although the British press relentlessly bashed French protectionism and the EU’s unjustified 
regulatory push, even The Economist defended the proposal as a useful attempt to simplify 
and harmonize the existing regulatory frameworks (Anonymous 2010). Indeed, the fund 
industry in London now has the advantage of providing a one-stop regulatory shop for all 
operations in the European market.  
France in turn obtained a regulatory framework for institutional investment that looks quite 
similar to the one it initially helped to shape for the retail mutual funds market. However, 
notwithstanding the insistence of the French government, the origin of funds is not an issue, 
as long as they comply with the regulatory requirements imposed on hedge fund managers.  
For the German government, any encompassing regulation is satisfactory, as they have the 
least amount of their industry’s economic interests at stake. Concerned with the preservation 
of the German corporate model, German MEPs most notably affected issues such as asset 
stripping, which was a central issue for private equity firms. The final agreement now limits 
the selling off of capital – or asset stripping – in the years after a company is bought by a 
private equity investor. Regulating asset stripping reduces the attractiveness for private 
equity firms to buy a company in order to sell off its assets and make a quick profit (EurActiv 
2010b).  
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In sum, despite heated political debates, the hedge fund regulation resembles other 
initiatives to harmonize operations in the European market. To be sure, the most important 
issue will be the implementation of the ambitious project. One will have to judge in several 
years whether the framework merely opened a pan-European market or actually provided 
additional control mechanisms over alternative investment that can be effectively used. 
What this case study has tried to demonstrate is the strategic nature of business-government 
interactions and intergovernmental negotiations in the EU. It is insufficient to state that 
countries will defend national advantages and existing industry structures, or that 
paradigmatic change can trigger important reorientations in the regulatory agenda. It is true 
that each government is very concerned with its industry interests and tries to make sure that 
policy proposals do not damage vital parts of their economies. Likewise, new economic ideas 
and the reorientation of public intervention after the crisis are also important in understanding 
the momentum of political activism. However, one needs to ask which economic interests a 
governments will ultimately defend and when paradigm shifts lead to political action.  
The answer given in this study is that it depends on the strategic constellation of actors at 
both levels: domestically and internationally. Domestically, a specific portion of the French 
industry skillfully lobbied the French government from a very early stage to protect the 
competitive conditions in its sector. This lobbying turned out to be very consequential for 
most of the negotiations, because it allowed the French government to build and maintain an 
alliance with Germany, which was very eager to advance hedge fund regulation. The 
feedback loops between the initial interests and the strategic advantages these provided are 
thus context-specific and can evolve over the course of negotiations, as historical 
institutionalism specifies. However, this evolution should not be reduced to a simple 
paradigm shift, a new pro-regulatory paradigm, or an ideological battle between Paris and 
the City of London.  
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